Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert

Tagged: Corporate Law

DOJ Updates Merger Remedies Manual

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Posted in Antitrust

On September 10, 2020

On September 3, 2020, two months after releasing the long-awaited Vertical Merger Guidelines, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice issued an update to its 2004 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies. The focus of the updated (and newly titled) Merger Remedies Manual is on structuring and enforcing remedies, short of full-stop injunctions, designed to cure competitive harms caused by mergers – both horizontal and vertical – that would lessen competition if left unchecked. The Manual begins with a set of guiding principles, among them that remedies should preserve premerger competition, but not create ongoing government regulation of the market; temporary relief should not be used to redress persistent competitive harm; the merging entities, not consumers, should bear the risk of a failed remedy; and a remedy must be enforceable to be effective. From these first principles flow two basic tenets of remedies in merger cases: first, that divestitures (so-called structural remedies) are preferable to conduct remedies aimed at regulating the merged firm’s post-merger operations, which are rarely appropriate, and, second, that settlements designed to rectify competitive harm (so-called consent decrees) must be clear, fully implemented, and strictly complied with. To this end, entire sections of the Manual address various aspects of divestitures: from the characteristics of an acceptable third-party buyer, to the ideal...

DOJ and FTC Issue Final Vertical Merger Guidelines

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Posted in Antitrust

On July 13, 2020

On June 30, 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) finalized their much-anticipated Vertical Merger Guidelines. The new Guidelines, which were last updated in 1984, seek to increase transparency around the analytical techniques, practices, and enforcement policies that U.S. antitrust authorities use to regulate mergers between firms at different stages of the supply chain (e.g., a furniture maker that acquires a producer of timber). Vertical mergers generally raise fewer anticompetitive concerns than horizontal mergers between direct competitors. This, in part, is because consolidation along the supply chain tends to result in lower prices, as distributors and finished goods manufacturers can source inputs at cost rather than at the markup they would pay to a third-party supplier. But, as the Guidelines make clear, vertical mergers “are not invariably innocuous”: a merged firm could raise the price for – and even withhold – a necessary input from its rivals or exploit sensitive business information about rivals that it obtains as part of the merger. These so-called unilateral effects threaten harm to competition in the relevant market if rivals wind up abandoning the market, leaving consumers with higher prices and less innovation as a result. Per the Guidelines, DOJ and FTC evaluate the extent to which a vertical merger will raise rivals’ costs...

DOJ Updates Corporate Compliance Program Evaluation Guidelines to Invite the Practice of Continuous and Evolving Improvements Through Data Analysis

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Posted in General Litigation

On June 24, 2020

The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently updated its Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs guidelines, which federal prosecutors consider when making decisions to prosecute corporate compliance violations, impose monetary penalties, and require future compliance commitments. The guidelines highlight what prosecutors should deem relevant in evaluating a corporate compliance program, both at the time of the offense(s) and at the time of the charging decision and resolution. In turn, the guidelines serve as a roadmap for corporate compliance and control personnel in designing a corporate compliance program, allocating resources to the program, evaluating the efficacy of the program in practice, and redesigning the program as needed on a regular basis. The updates make clear that the DOJ is interested in the continuous evaluation and evolution of corporate compliance programs, and that prosecutors will now be examining whether and how a compliance program incorporates data analytics. As before, the guidelines instruct federal prosecutors to ask three questions, though now slightly revised as follows: Is the compliance program well designed? Is the program adequately resourced and empowered to function effectively? Does the program work in practice? A welcome addition to the guidelines is a stated recognition that the circumstances of the company, e.g., size, industry, geographic footprint, regulatory landscape, etc., are relevant to prosecutors’ analysis. The guidelines also suggest...

NJ Supreme Court Narrowly Construes Shareholder’s Right to Inspection of Corporate Records

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Posted in General Litigation

On June 5, 2019

In R.A. Feuer v. Merck & Co., Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s narrow construction of the scope of a shareholder’s right to inspect a corporation’s records under N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28 and the common law. In the underlying case, a Merck & Co, Inc. shareholder sought documents in order to elicit evidence that Merck acted wrongfully in its acquisition of another pharmaceutical firm. Merck appointed a “Working Group” to respond to the shareholder’s demand, which rejected the shareholder’s request for documents relating to the acquisition. Following this rejection, the shareholder sought twelve broad categories of corporate documents, including documents pertaining to the Working Group’s activities, communications, and formation; documents provided to the board regarding the target pharmaceutical firm and two of its drugs; and the board’s consideration of the shareholder’s demands and the Working Group’s recommendation. Merck disclosed pertinent minutes of the board and of the Working Group, but denied the remainder of the shareholder’s demand. The shareholder sued Merck, alleging entitlement to the documents under N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28(4), which permits a shareholder to compel the corporation to produce its “books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders,” and the common law. The trial court denied the shareholder’s request and the Appellate Division affirmed. In a per curiam decision, the New...

Delaware Supreme Court Orders Production of Emails in Response to Section 220 Demand and Refuses to Restrict Knock-On Litigation to Delaware

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Posted in General Litigation

On February 4, 2019

In KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court required a corporation to produce emails in response to a “books and records” demand under 8 Del. C. §220; it also refused to limit any knock-on litigation on the merits to the Delaware Court of Chancery. KT4 is a stockholder in Palantir and received certain rights under a series of Investor Rights Agreements and a First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement. After a falling out between KT4 and Palantir’s management, Palantir amended the Investor Rights Agreement in ways detrimental to KT4. KT4 responded with a request to inspect Palantir’s “books and records” pursuant to 8 Del. C. §220, which entitles a stockholder to inspect a corporation’s “books and records” if, and to the extent that, the requested inspection “is for a proper purpose.” Palantir refused to comply, and KT4 filed a §220 action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel production of the requested documents. The Court of Chancery ruled that KT4 had a statutory “proper purpose” of investigating three areas of potential corporate wrongdoing: 1) Palantir’s failure to hold stockholder meetings, 2) Palantir’s amendment of the Investor Rights Agreement, and 3) Palantir’s potential breach of the Investor Rights and Co-Sale Agreements. The Court of Chancery further held that KT4 was “entitled to...

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Appraisal Rights for Stockholders Who Relinquish Control of their Corporation Through Merger Involving a Special Merger Subsidiary

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Posted in General Litigation

On June 28, 2018

Delaware law generally grants appraisal rights to shareholders of corporations involved in statutory mergers or consolidations. But, what are the rights of shareholders when control of their corporation is relinquished through a merger between a specially-created merger subsidiary and another corporation? According to Chancellor Bouchard’s recent opinion, the shareholders have no appraisal rights because they do not own shares in a “constituent corporation in the merger.” Chancellor Bouchard also found that the shareholders are not entitled to appraisal rights because they will retain their shares in the parent corporation in the contemplated transaction. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., a privately-held corporation, wanted to combine their businesses. They therefore agreed to a so-called reverse triangular merger, pursuant to which (1) Dr. Pepper will create a new subsidiary, (2) that subsidiary will be merged into Keurig’s owner, Maple Parent Holdings Corp., and (3) Maple Parent will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dr. Pepper. In addition, Maple Parent will pay a $9 billion dividend to Dr. Pepper and receive enough shares in Dr. Pepper to give it a controlling 87% share of Dr. Pepper’s common stock. Maple Parent’s $9 billion payment to Dr. Pepper will then be used to help finance special cash dividends of $103.75 per share to Dr....

Access Denied: NJ Appellate Division Clarifies Shareholder’s Right to Inspection of Corporate Records

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Posted in General Litigation

On June 25, 2018

In R.A. Feuer v. Merck & Co., Inc., the New Jersey Appellate Division, in a to-be-published opinion, narrowly construed the scope of a shareholder’s right to inspect a corporation’s records under N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28 and the common law. A Merck & Co, Inc. shareholder appealed from the dismissal of his complaint seeking various corporate records, including twelve broad categories of documents. The shareholder sought evidence that Merck acted wrongfully in its acquisition of another pharmaceutical firm. After Merck appointed a working group to assess the shareholder’s concerns, the shareholder requested documents pertaining generally to the working group’s activities, communications, and formation; documents provided to the board regarding the target pharmaceutical firm and two of its drugs; and the board’s considerations of the shareholder’s demands and the working group’s recommendation. Merck disclosed pertinent minutes of the board and of the working group, but denied the remainder of the shareholder’s demand. The trial court determined that the shareholder’s demand exceeded the scope of the “books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders,” which the shareholder had a statutory right to inspect and that the common law did not expand that statutory right. The Appellate Division affirmed, narrowly construing the plain language of N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28(4). According to the court, “minutes” refers to “shareholder, board, and executive committee...

NY Updates Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies

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Posted in E-Discovery / Privacy and Data Security

On January 9, 2017

On December 28, 2016, the New York Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) published an updated version of its proposed “Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies.” The updated regulations will become effective on March 1, 2017. As previously reported, these regulations are an important step in the ongoing national dialogue about reasonable and necessary cybersecurity standards for all businesses.

The Ties That Bind: When Will a Court Expel a Member of an LLC?

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Posted in General Litigation

On August 8, 2016

In IE Test, LLC v. Carroll, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed when a limited liability company (LLC) can expel a member under a statute authorizing a member’s disassociation for conduct that has made it “not reasonably practicable to carry on” the LLC’s activities. IE Test had three members, two of whom actively ran the business and drew salaries, and a third who played no role in the LLC’s day-to-day affairs. Before an operating agreement was executed, a dispute arose between the two active members and the passive member over the passive member’s compensation. Consequently, no operating agreement was ever signed. The two active members then sought to judicially disassociate the passive member on the statutory ground that the impasse and absence of an operating agreement made it “not reasonably practicable” that he could continue as a member. The trial court granted summary judgment, expelling the passive member, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

In “Spring-Loaded” Options Case, Court Finds Failure to Disclose Board’s “Unclean Heart” Does Not Violate Federal Securities Laws But Allows Common Law Fiduciary Duty Claims to Proceed Against Directors Approving Options

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Posted in Securities

On June 8, 2016

In a far-reaching opinion addressing a host of issues relating to the granting of so-called “spring-loaded” stock options to a corporation’s board of directors, the District of New Jersey dismissed a claim under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act because federal securities laws do not require the corporation to disclose in its proxy statement that the options were part of a “spring-loading” scheme. But the court allowed common-law breach of fiduciary duty claims to proceed against the directors who served on the board’s compensation committee under the entire-fairness doctrine.

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